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STRIKING OUT WITH TITLE IX: HORNER v. KENTUCKY HIGH
SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASS'N AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S
INTERPRETATION OF UNINTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE IX AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
RECOVERING MONETARY DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX has had a tremendous impact on women in the United
States.' One important benefit of Title IX is the impact it has had
on female participation in intercollegiate sports. 2 It has been
called the "landmark legislation that bans sex discrimination in
schools in both academics and athletics."3 Despite its positive im-
pact, discrimination still occurs, and many turn to the courts for a
remedy. Thus, the courts must determine what is a viable remedy,
and what a plaintiff must show in order to get that remedy.
The judicial development in the area of Tide IX is important
because gender equity in sports has an important effect on our
lives. 4 Often, when discrimination occurs, it is not done intention-
ally. For example, it is not unusual for a federally funded institu-
tion to make a facially neutral policy that is not intended to
discriminate, but the policy nevertheless has a discriminatory effect
against a class of people. When such unintentional discrimination
happens, a remedy must be available to the victims of the
discrimination.
This Note discusses this type of discrimination in the case of
Homer v. Kentucky High School Athletic Association.5 First, the Note
discusses the facts of the case and explores the background of Title
1. See 145 CONG. REc. H6403 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (statement of Mrs.
Christenson, Speaker Pro Tempore) (noting that Title IX was important legisla-
tion and had immeasurable impact).
2. See id. (remarking upon several success stories that have come from Title
IX).
3. 145 CONG. REC. H6399 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (statement of Ms.
Schakowsky).
4. See Left on the Sidelines, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 15,
1998, at 14A (stating that equal opportunity to participate in sports is important
because (1) girls who play sports are less likely to suffer osteoporosis, heart disease
and obesity; (2) frequent exercise during a female's reproductive lifetime may
bring a significant reduction in the risk of breast cancer; and (3) girls who are
regularly physically active are less likely to adopt high risk behaviors such as
smoking).
5. 206 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2000).
(421)
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IX and several of its important and relevant cases to the issue at
hand. 6 The Note then examines the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Homer, focusing on the issue of whether compensatory damages are
available when a facially neutral policy is challenged under Title IX
without a showing of an intentional violation. 7 The Note also ana-
lyzes the dissent in Homer, which determined that the standard of
deliberate indifference should govern in Title IX cases.8 Finally,
this Note discusses the holding of Homer in greater depth, focusing
on its strengths and weaknesses, and concludes that the Sixth Cir-




The Kentucky High School Athletic Association ("KHSAA")
manages interscholastic athletics in public and private high schools
in Kentucky.10 Due to limited resources, the Kentucky State Educa-
tion Board's ("Board's") policy was that a new sport would not be
sanctioned unless at least twenty-five percent of the member
schools were willing to participate (the "twenty-five percent
rule")." In 1988, survey results showed that twenty-six schools, ap-
proximately nine percent of the member schools, indicated that
they would participate in girls' fast-pitch softball.1 2 A second sur-
vey, taken in 1992, indicated that fifty schools, or about seventeen
6. See infra notes 10-92 and accompanying text.
7. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 689-92 (holding that Title IX plaintiffs must prove
intentional violation in order to receive compensatory damages); see also infra
notes 93-120 and accompanying text.
8. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 698; see also infra notes 121-30 and accompanying
text.
9. See infra notes 131-79 and accompanying text.
10. See Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 268-69 (6th Cir.
1994) ("Homer I") (citing 702 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 7:065(1) (1993)). The KHSAA
"sanctions" certain interscholastic sports, meaning that it recognizes and sponsors
state tournaments in those sports. See Homer I, 43 F.3d at 269. The KHSAA is a
voluntary and self-managing association of public, private and parochial schools.
See id. The member schools must be in compliance with the KHSAA's constitution,
by-laws, policies and procedures. See id.
11. See id. at 269 (noting that, in 1994, KHSAA sanctioned eighteen sports,
ten for boys and eight for girls). The Board has exclusive control and management
of all of the Kentucky common schools, as well as the programs operated in the
schools, including interscholastic athletics. See id. at 268. Pursuant to the statute,
the Board can delegate its responsibility of managing and controlling interscholas-
tic athletic programs to an agent. See Homner, 43 F.3d at 268 (citing Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 156.070(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1995)). Here, the Board had designated the
KHSAA to be such an agent. See id.
12. See id. at 269.
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percent, would participate in girls' fast-pitch softball. 13 Thus, be-
cause the KHSAA's minimum twenty-five percent rule had not been
met, the KHSAA refused to sanction girls' fast-pitch softball. 14
In response, the plaintiffs, a group of female student athletes
attending Kentucky high schools, filed suit.15 They claimed that
the KHSAA's refusal to sanction fast-pitch softball violated, inter
alia, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 ("Title IX").16 The plaintiffs specifically al-
leged that the KHSAA's failure to sponsor girls' fast-pitch softball
reduced the female students' abilities to compete for college fast-
pitch softball athletic scholarships.1 7
In 1994, the Sixth Circuit in Homer I reversed the district court
on the plaintiffs' Title IX claim, holding that "issues of fact
abounded" as to whether the KHSAA had complied with Title IX.1 8
On remand, the district court again found for the defendants, find-
ing the plaintiffs' claims under Title IX moot due to a recent
amendment by the Kentucky General Assembly regulating high
13. See id. (noting that record did not reflect whether female athletes at mem-
ber schools were either polled or consulted before schools responded to survey).
14. See id. In the district court, the Board defended this action on the basis of
their "twenty-five percent rule;" the court granted the Board's motion for summary
judgment. See id.
15. See Horner1, 43 F.3d at 270 (contending that defendants violated Title IX,
the Equal Protection Clause and state law by sanctioning fewer sports and by refus-
ing to sanction fast-pitch softball).
16. See Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 685, 687 (6th Cir.
2000). The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and state law. See Homer I, 43 F.3d at 276. As to the equal protec-
tion claim, the Homer I court affirmed the district court's dismissal because the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the defendants had intentionally discriminated
against them, as is required by the Equal Protection Clause. See id. Specifically, the
court held that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the defendants had adopted the
twenty-five percent rule because of, rather than in spite of, its disparate impact on
females, and that disparate impact alone was insufficient to demonstrate an equal
protection violation. See id. Title IX is Title IX of Act June 23, 1972, P.L. 92-318,
86 Stat. 373; it generally appears as 20 U.S.C. § 1681. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972).
17. See Horner, 206 F.3d at 688 (comparing female students with male students
who played high school baseball and then competed for college baseball athletic
scholarships). The plaintiffs in this case were asserting a "disparate impact" theory;
that, although the Board's twenty-five percent rule was neutral on its face, it had a
disparate and discriminatory impact on females. See id.
18. See id. (citing Hornerl, 43 F.3d at 275). The district court granted defend-
ants' motions for summary judgment on the Title IX claim, holding that the KH-
SAA had complied with Title IX because they had offered equal opportunities in
accordance with the interests and abilities of the students. See id. (citing same).
The district court also dismissed the suit due to the association and Board's con-
tention that the twenty-five percent rule had been upheld. See High School Softball
Players Strike Out With Title IX Suit, SPORTS & ENT. LITIG. REP., Apr. 2000, at 14; see
also supra notes 11, 14 and accompanying text.
2002]
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school sports. 19 On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the district
court's finding that money damages were not available under Tide
IX without evidence of intentional discrimination.2 0 Having con-
sidered the plaintiffs' claims, the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that
monetary damages under Tide IX are only available when a facially
neutral policy is challenged when the plaintiff proves that the de-
fendant intentionally violated Tide IX.2 1
III. BACKGROUND
A. Title IX History
Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments in
1972.22 Title IX states that "[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subject to discrimination under any educational program or ac-
tivity receiving federal financial assistance . "..."23 The statutory
purpose of Tide IX is to prevent the use of federal funds to support
discriminatory practices and to give individuals protection against
such discriminatory practices; in other words, Title IX is used to
eliminate gender discrimination in educational institutions. 24 The
legislative history of Title IX shows that it was to be "a strong and
comprehensive measure [that would] provide women with solid le-
gal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which
is serving to perpetuate second-class citizenship for American
women."
25
19. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 688; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.070(2) (Banks-Bald-
win 1995). The amended statute directed that, if a school offered one of two simi-
lar sports, the Board and the KHSAA must offer a sport for which the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") offered athletic scholarships. See Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.070(2) (a) (Banks-Baldwin 1995). Thus, because it was le-
gally required that any school offering slow-pitch softball must also include fast-
pitch, the high school was compelled to offer fast-pitch. See Bob Considine, Sports
Wire, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, NJ), Oct. 3, 2000, at 10. Currently, most Ken-
tucky schools offer fast-pitch softball for female athletes. See id.
20. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 689. The district court also held that the plaintiffs'
claims for monetary damages under Title IX failed since they had not presented
any evidence of intentional discrimination. See id.
21. See id. at 692 (affirming district court's findings).
22. See Ray Yasser & SamuelJ. Schiller, Gender Equity in Athletics: The New Battle-
ground of Interscholastic Sports, 15 CtRDozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 371, 372 (1997) (ex-
plaining history of Title IX).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1972).
24. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); see also Yasser &
Schiller, supra note 22, at 371-72 (noting that Title IX had vastly increased athletic
opportunities available for women at intercollegiate levels).
25. 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
[Vol. 8: p. 421
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In 1975, the United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare ("HEW") adopted regulations that interpreted Title
IX.26 These regulations made it clear that Title IX applied to edu-
cational sports programs.2 7 In addition, 34 C.F.R. 106.41(a) in-
cludes both intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics within the
"program or activity" requirements of Title IX.28 The regulations,
therefore, make up an important part of litigation to enforce Title
IX's requirement on interscholastic athletic programs.2 9
An early and important Title IX case is Cannon v. University of
Chicago.30 In Cannon, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1681 as pro-
viding an implied right of action under Title IX.31 This decision
signified that an individual could bring an action pursuant to Title
IX directly, without having to exhaust administrative procedures.3 2
In the same year that the Supreme Court decided Cannon, the
Office of Civil Rights of HEW, in an attempt to further clarify Title
IX's statutory and regulatory mandate, issued a policy interpreta-
tion of Title IX ("Policy Interpretation"). 3 This Policy Interpreta-
26. See Yasser & Schiller, supra note 22, at 374 (citing 40 Fed. Reg, 24,128
(1975) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (1996)).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 374-75. The regulations note ten factors that are to be consid-
ered in determining whether an institution is complying with Title IX's mandate of
equal athletic opportunity. They are:
(1) whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) the provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) travel and per diem allowance;
(5) opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and
(10) publicity.
34 C.F.R. 106.41(c)(1)-(10) (1996).
29. SeeYasser & Schiller, supra note 22, at 375 (recognizing that federal courts
defer to regulations when interpreting and applying Titie IX).
30. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
31. See id. at 709-11 (noting that Title IX was derived from Title VI, and be-
cause Congress had made private remedies available under Title VI, then similar
remedies must be intended under Title IX).
32. SeeYasser & Schiller, supra note 22, at 373 (stating that "aggrieved individ-
uals can directly enforce their Title IX rights in court without first bringing their
claims before an administrative agency") (quoting ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING
DowN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX (1994)).
33. See id. at 376 (noting that Policy Interpretation does not have same "force
of law" status as Title IX statute and regulations, but still has been used as standard
of Title IX compliance by many courts) (citing Title IX of Education Amendments
of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg.
2002]
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tion states that educational institutions must provide equal athletic
opportunities in three general areas in order to comply with Title
IX and its regulations.34  The three general areas are: (1)
equivalent awarding of scholarships; (2) equal participation oppor-
tunities in athletics; and (3) equal treatment and benefits for both
sexes.
35
An obstacle to Title IX, however, arrived with the Supreme
Court decision of Grove City College v. Bell.36 In Grove City, the Court
held that Title IX extended only to certain programs or activities
that received federal funding, not to an educational institution as a
whole.3 7 With respect to interscholastic athletics, Grove City conse-
quently indicated that Title IX was applicable to a school's sports
programs only if the school's athletic department received federal
funds directly.38
71,413, 71,414 (Dec. 11, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (the Policy Interpreta-
tion); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 910 (M.D. La. 1996)).
34. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 33, at 71,413.
35. See id. at 71,414. With regard to the second requirement, the Policy Inter-
pretation sets out a test to determine whether an institution is in compliance with
Title IX's requirement of equal opportunity for participation. See id. The overall
test is composed of three separate tests:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male
and female students are provided in numbers substantially propor-
tionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is de-
monstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among inter-
collegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it
can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members
of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the pre-
sent program.
Id. at 71,418.
36. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
37. See id. at 572 (noting that opposite holding would be inconsistent with the
"program-specific" nature of the statute); see also O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112,
117 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that Supreme Court defined "education program
or activity" narrowly in Grove City decision). In O'Connor, a student alleged that she
had been subjected to sexual harassment by an employer at her internship pro-
gram. See id. at 113-14. The Second Circuit held that a Title IX claim could not be
asserted against the internship program center, since the center did not qualify as
an education program as contemplated by Title IX. See id. at 118-19.
38. See Yasser & Schiller, supra note 22, at 373 (noting that Grove City limited
Title IX scope to only include specific programs or activities within educational
institution that directly received financial support from federal government).
[Vol. 8: p. 421
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Congress reacted to the Grove City decision by passing the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ("Section 1687"). 39 Section 1687
was enacted in order to partially overrule the Grove City decision. 40
According to Section 1687, Title IX applies to an education pro-
gram or activity in its entirety if "any part" of such program or activ-
ity is given federal financial assistance. 41 In demonstrating that
Grove City's "program-specific" approach was not the intended appli-
cation of Title IX, Congress further clarified that, for the purposes
of Tide IX, a "program or activity" meant any program or activity of
an educational institution so long as any part of the institution re-
ceived federal financial assistance. 42
B. Titles VI and VII
Tide IX was modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Tide VI") of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 3 Tide IX was enacted to "supplement the
Civil Rights Act of 1964's ban on racial discrimination in the work-
place and in universities."44 Title IX and Title VI share the same
goals; in fact, the statutes have been said to mirror each other's
substantive provisions. 45 As a result, many courts, including the Su-
39. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat. 28).
40. See O'Connor, 126 F.3d at 117. Grove City held that an entity that receives
federal funding indirectly may also be held to be a recipient of federal financial
assistance for the purposes of Title IX. See id; see also Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 107
F.3d 609, 615 n.7 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that legislation was deemed to re-
verse Supreme Court's decision in Grove City, which had narrowed Title IX's appli-
cation to institutions).
41. See Buckley v. Archdiocese of Rockville Centre, 992 F. Supp. 586, 588
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h)(1975)). For the purposes of Title IX,
a "recipient" is defined as follows:
[A] ny State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a
State or political subdivision thereof, any private agency, institution or
organization, or other entity, or any other person, to whom Federal finan-
cial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and
which operates an education program or activity which receives or bene-
fits from such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee or
transferee.
Id.
42. See Yasser & Schiller, supra note 22, at 373-74 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1687
(1994)). Also noted was Homer l's statement that "Congress has made clear its
intent to extend the scope of Title IX's equal opportunity obligations to the fur-
thest reaches of an institution's programs." Homer , 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir.
1994).
43. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 167 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting Su-
preme Court statement in Cannon that "[t]he drafters of Title IX explicitly as-
sumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been ...
44. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1994).
45. See id. (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 566 (1984)); see also
Jeffrey H. Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women, 3
2002]
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preme Court, have interpreted Title IX issues by looking to Title VI
caselaw.46 In addition, many courts have also looked to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e ("Title VII"), which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment, in interpreting and applying Title IX.47
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New
York48 is a Title VI case that has provided helpful analysis in evaluat-
ing Title IX cases. 49 In Guardians, black and Hispanic police of-
ficers sued the city of New York under Title VI, alleging
discriminatory examinations that resulted in disproportionate lay-
offs of their members. 50 Although unable to agree on an opinion,
five members of the Court agreed that one did not have to prove
discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI. 51 The
DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131, 133-34 (1996) (noting that Title IX and Tide VI
share same constitutional underpinnings); Jill Suzanne Miller, Note: Title VI and
Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution to Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 699, at 715 (stating that "the similarity [between Title VI and IX] is
striking and intentional" and that "[t]ifle IX's provisions themselves suggest that
Tide VI's regulations should be incorporated into those of Title IX").
46. See Yusuf 35 F.3d at 714 (citing Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. and
Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316-17 (10th Cir. 1987)); see also Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (noting that Title VI and Title IX
operate in same manner and are parallel to each other except that Title IX prohib-
its sex discrimination while Title VI prohibits race discrimination); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992) (citing Guardians for its Title
VI analysis on Title IX issue).
47. See Mabry, 813 F.2d at 317 (finding "no persuasive reason" not to apply
Title VII's substantive standards to Title IX suit). The Mabry court regarded Title
VII as the most appropriate analogue to Title IX because the two statutes prohib-
ited the same conduct (sex discrimination), and because the two titles used similar
language used in portions of the tides. See id.
48. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
49. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 690 (noting that Spending Clause analysis was ap-
plied to Title IX case as it had been applied in Guardians, a Title VI case).
50. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 585. The written examinations were adminis-
tered by New York City and were used to make entry-level appointments to the
city's Police Department. See id. Each plaintiff involved in the suit had passed the
test and had been hired as a police officer. See id. Appointments, however, were
made in order of test score, and the plaintiffs were hired later than similarly situ-
ated whites. See id. This appointment process therefore, lessened the plaintiffs'
seniority and related benefits. See id. Additionally, when the Police Department
fired officers, the Department first fired those officers, who had scored lower on
the exams. See id. As a result, the layoffs disproportionately affected plaintiff black
and Hispanic officers. See id. The district court found that the challenged exami-
nations had a discriminatory impact on the scores and pass rates of blacks and
Hispanics and therefore, were not job-related. See id. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed these findings. See id.
51. See id. at 592-93 (stating that, "it must be concluded that Title VI reaches
unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination"). The Court looked to the legisla-
tive history of Title VI and recognized that the statute had been consistently ap-
plied in that manner for almost two decades without Congressional interference.
See id.
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Court majority, however, went on to conclude that a private plain-
tiff should only. recover injunctive, non-compensatory relief for un-
intentional violations of Title VI. 52 In announcing the judgment of
the Court, Justice White looked to statutory language and past cases
to conclude that Title VI includes unintentional, disparate-impact
discrimination as well as intentional discrimination. 53 Justice White
then turned to a discussion of the Spending Clause analysis to de-
termine whether compensatory damages should be allowed for un-
intentional violations of Title V. 54 In making this determination,
the Court relied on Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halerdman,
stating that "'in no [Spending Clause] case ... have we required a
State to provide money to plaintiffs, much less required' a State to
assume more burdensome obligations. '5 5 Justice White (as well as
four otherjustices) thus concluded that compensatory relief, or any
other relief based on violations of conditions of federal funds, was
unavailable as a private remedy for unintentional Title VI
violations.56
In response to this conclusion, Justice Marshall dissented to ar-
gue specifically that compensatory relief should be awarded to pri-
vate Title VI plaintiffs without proof of discriminatory animus. 57
Additionally, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, dissented to state that private individuals should be able to
recover appropriate relief to victims of discrimination from federal
funding recipients. 58 The next term, a unanimous Court read the
Guardians opinion to state that "[a] majority of the Court agreed
52. See id. at 607 (stating, "I am convinced that discriminatory intent is not an
essential element of a Title VI violation, but that a private plaintiff should recover
only injunctive, noncompensatory relief for a defendant's unintentional violations
of Title VI."). The Court arrived at this conclusion in part by comparing Title VI
to Title II, observing that, "[1]ike the drafters of Title II, they did not intend to
allow private plaintiffs to recover monetary awards." Id. at 601.
53. See id. at 592 (noting that, because the word "discrimination" is ambigu-
ous, it should be subject to same construction that had been given to Title VII, at
least concerning disparate-impact discrimination).
54. See id. at 595-96 (recognizing that "make whole" remedies are not usually
appropriate in private actions seeking relief for violations of statutes that had been
passed by Congress pursuant to its Spending Clause power (citing Pennhurst State
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981))).
55. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 597 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 29).
56. See id. at 602-03 (observing that no legislative history rebuts Pennhurst pre-
sumption of granting only limited injunctive relief for unintentional violations of
statutes passed pursuant to spending power).
57. See id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall supported his dissent by
noting that when Congress intends to place restrictions on private rights of action,
it has explicitly said so; however, nothing in Title VI or its history supported such a
restriction on a court's ability to remedy a statutory violation. See id. at 628.
58. See id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2002] 429
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that... relief is available to private plaintiffs for all discrimination,
whether intentional or unintentional, that is actionable under Title
VI.'59 Although the Guardians case is comprised of a variety of con-
currences and dissents, it is useful for its majority's decision that
Title VI does not allow compensatory damages without a showing of
an intentional violation.60
C. Title IX Sexual Harassment Cases
At the time of its enactment, many plaintiffs used Title IX to
challenge discriminatory admissions policies, sex-based allocation
of funds in school sports programs, and discriminatory hiring and
promotion policies. 61 Recent cases, however, often use Title IX to
combat sexual harassment.62 Many cases have looked at intentional
discrimination under Title IX in this context.63
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools6 4 examines teacher-on-
student sexual harassment under Title IX. In this case, a female
student alleged that the school and its employees knew that a
teacher sexually harassed her but did nothing to stop it.65 Until this
case, lower courts had been split on the issue of whether Title IX
authorized an award of monetary damages. 66
59. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 n.9 (1984).
60. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607; see also Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157
F.3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 1998). The Ferguson court looked to Guardians to determine
whether compensatory relief should be allowed under Title II of the American
With Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. See id. The court ultimately held that
compensatory damages were not available under Title II without a showing of dis-
criminatory intent. See id.
61. See Chantal N. Senatus, Note: Peer Harassment Under Titk IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972: Where's the Intent? 24 FopH"A URB. L.J. 379, at 380-81 (noting
that Congress enacted Title IX in response to growing concern about sex discrimi-
nation in educational institutions).
62. See id. at 381. The Note argued that in peer harassment cases, school
districts should be liable under a "knew or should have known" standard where the
school's intent to discriminate would be determined by circumstances of each
case. See id. at 382.
63. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998)
(holding that damages may not be recovered for teacher-student sexual harass-
ment case under Title IX unless school district official is deliberately indifferent to
misconduct); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (hold-
ing damages remedy available for Title IX suit).
64. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
65. See id. 63-64. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that Title IX does not authorize an award of damages; the Court of Appeals af-
firmed this finding. See id. at 64.
66. Compare Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617, 622 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding that Title IX did not allow monetary damages recovery), with
Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 787-89 (3d Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that Title IX did allow monetary damages recovery).
(Vol. 8: p. 421
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The Supreme Court in Franklin referred to its earlier decision
in Guardians, stating that "a clear majority expressed the view that
damages were available under Title VI in an action seeking reme-
dies for an intentional violation .... ," 67 In doing so, the Franklin
Court recognized the general rule that, without direction to the
contrary from Congress, federal courts may award any appropriate
relief brought pursuant to a federal statute. 68 The Court then ad-
dressed the issue of whether Congress intended to limit relief
under Title IX.69 In considering Congress' intent, the Supreme
Court ultimately concluded that Congress did not intend to limit
the remedies available in a Title IX suit, and that a damages remedy
was available for an action brought to enforce Title IX.7°
Finally, and most importantly, the Franklin Court discussed re-
spondents' argument that the normal presumption, favoring all ap-
propriate remedies, should not apply because Congress enacted
Title IX pursuant to its Spending Clause power.7 1 In its discussion,
the Court referred to the Pennhurst decision, in which the Court
previously observed that remedies were limited under Spending
Clause statutes "when the alleged violation was unintentional.' 72 As
the Franklin Court explained, " [t] he point of not permitting mone-
tary damages for an unintentional violation is that the receiving en-
tity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary
award."
7 3
67. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 595).
68. See id. (noting past cases in which courts granted relief under Title VI).
69. See id. at 71 (observing that Cannon Court concluded that statute did not
support express right of action, and Congress said nothing about applicable reme-
dies for implied rights of action).
70. See id. at 72, 76 (using two amendments to Title IX enacted after Cannon
as basis for conclusion). The Court determined ultimately that Title IX is enforce-
able through an implied right of action for monetary damages as well as injunctive
relief. See id.
71. See id. at 74 (recognizing that respondents' argument was consistent with
Court of Appeals' reasoning).
72. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1981)). The Franklin Court did not expressly state, how-
ever, that Title IX was a Spending Clause statute. See Yasser, supra note 22, at 374
(observing that although Franklin Court had not expressly decided whether Title
IX was Spending Clause statute, it held that compensatory damages were available
for intentional violations of Title IX); see also infra note 140 and accompanying
text.
73. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (noting that
notice problem does not arise in case where intentional discrimination is alleged).
The Court also relayed its belief that Congress must not have intended for federal
moneys to be expended to support intentional actions that it sought to prohibit.
See id. at 75.
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Furthermore, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,74
the Supreme Court held that a recipient of federal funds would be
liable in damages under Title IX if it was deliberately indifferent to
known acts of sexual harassment by a teacher. 75 In Gebser, a student
and teacher had a sexual relationship, but the relationship was
never reported to school officials. 76 Again, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on the issue of notice, concluding that it would "'frustrate
the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages recovery against a
school district for a teacher's sexual harassment ... without actual
notice to a school district official." 77
The Supreme Court further extended its previous rulings con-
cerning teacher-student sexual harassment to include student-stu-
dent harassment in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.78
Again citing the Spending Clause analysis that recipients of federal
funding must have adequate notice of potential liability, the Court
held that an action under Title IX would lie where a funding recipi-
ent acted with deliberate indifference to known acts of harass-
ment.79 The Court added that the harassment had to be "so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the
74. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
75. See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (observing that, without further direction from
Congress, implied damages remedy should be similar to express remedial scheme:
that damages remedy would not lie unless official that had authority to address and
correct alleged discrimination had actual knowledge of discrimination but failed
to respond).
76. See id. at 278. The plaintiff testified that, although she knew that the de-
fendant's conduct was improper, she did not know how to react and she wanted to
continue having him as a teacher. See id. The relationship was discovered when a
police officer found the couple engaging in sexual intercourse. See id.
77. Id. at 285 (noting that Congress did not expressly create private right of
action under Title IX; therefore, statutory text did not shed light on Congressional
intent in terms of available remedies). Thus, the court tried to infer how the 1972
Congress would have addressed the issue if the action had been included as an
express provision in the statute. See id. (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994)).
78. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). In the Davis case, a female student sued under Title
IX, alleging that she had been the victim of sexual harassment by another student
in her class. See id. at 632. The district court had dismissed the case on the
grounds that "student-on-student," or peer, harassment did not provide a private
cause of action under the statute. See id. at 633. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
finding. See id. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a plaintiff may bring a
private damages action against a school board in cases of student-on-student har-
assment, but only where the funding recipient acted with deliberate indifference
to known acts of harassment. See id.
79. See id. at 640, 648. The Court observed that since Title IX was consistently
treated as Spending Clause legislation, private damages must only be available
when federal funding recipients had notice of their alleged misconduct. See id. at
640. Again quoting Pennhurst, the Court noted that there cannot be an acceptance
of a contract if a State is not aware of conditions imposed on it. See id.
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victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits pro-
vided by the school."80
D. Other Courts' Decisions
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,8 female students attend-
ing Louisiana State University ("LSU") filed suit against the school,
alleging that LSU was in violation of Title IX.82 The district court
concluded that a Title IX plaintiff had to prove intentional discrim-
ination by a federal funding recipient before recovering monetary
damages. 83 The Pederson appellate court declined to address the
accuracy of that conclusion. 84
Other courts have also discussed the intent requirement of Ti-
tle IX, although not specifically in the context of compensatory
damages. 85 In Yusuf v. Vassar College,86 for example, the district
court noted that neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has determined whether intent must be shown in
Title IX cases.8 7 Although recognizing the wide range of views on
this issue, the Yusufcourt leaned towards the conclusion that a Title
IX plaintiff could prevail on the basis of disparate impact alone. 88
80. Id. at 650, 651 (noting that district's knowing refusal to take any action in
response to discrimination "would fly in the face of Title IX's core principles
81. 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
82. See id. at 864 (alleging that LSU denied students equal opportunity to
compete in intercollegiate athletics and for athletic scholarships, equal access to
benefits and services provided to varsity intercollegiate athletes, and discriminated
against females in terms of athletic scholarships and compensation paid coaches).
83. See id. at 879-80. Although the district court found that the claims at issue
in the case were a "very close" question, it ultimately held that LSU did not inten-
tionally violate Title IX. See id. at 880. The appellate court reversed, holding that
LSU did intentionally violate Title IX. See id.
84. See id. at 880 n.17 (noting that court need not address that issue because
LSU did intentionally violate Title IX, and appellants had not argued issue of
whether damages should be available for unintentional discrimination).
85. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 833 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that Title IX claim required proof of discriminatory intent); Haffer
v. Temple, 678 F. Supp. 517, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs need not
prove discriminatory intent to succeed on Title IX claim).
86. 827 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
87. See Yusuf 827 F. Supp. at 956 (noting that courts examining issue are
divided).
88. See id. at 956-57 (observing that "a number of courts have held that a Title
IX plaintiff could prevail on the basis of disparate impact"). Compare Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that violation of Title VI
requires intentional discriminatory act and same standard should be used for Title
IX); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1193
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that Title IX requires showing of intentional discrimina-
tion); and Nagel v. Avon Bd. of Educ., 575 F. Supp. 105, 111 (D. Conn. 1983)
(stating that, since plaintiff had failed to prove intentional discrimination, her
2002]
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Furthermore, in Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,8 9
the Tenth Circuit also faced the question of whether Tide IX re-
quired proof of discriminatory intent.90 The defendant used a Tide
VI analogy to argue that intent was a requisite for a Tide IX viola-
tion.9 ' The court concluded that a Title IX plaintiff need not prove
an intentional violation in order to succeed on a claim. 92
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
The Homer court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims for mone-
tary damages failed because the plaintiffs had not shown any evi-
dence of intentional discrimination. 93 In response to the district
court's holding, the plaintiffs argued that Title IX does not require
intentional discrimination in order to recover monetary damages. 94
In rejecting this argument, the Sixth Circuit relied on a number of
pertinent Supreme Court cases, as well as other statutes after which
Title IX was modeled. 95
In reaching its decision, the Homer majority looked at a history
of key Title IX cases and ultimately determined that proof of intent
is required in order to get compensatory relief for any kind of Title
claim under Title IX must fail); with Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dept., 709 F. Supp.
345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs need not prove intentional dis-
crimination under Title IX); and Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Pa. Sys. of Higher
Educ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (same).
89. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
90. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832. The court ultimately determined that the dis-
trict court did not err in failing to require proof of discriminatory intent. See id. at
833.
91. See id. at 832. The defendant reasoned that, since Tide IX was modeled
after Title VI, and discriminatory intent is required to prove a violation of Title VI,
then discriminatory intent must be required to prove a violation of Title IX as well.
See id.
92. See id. at 833. In making this decision, the court chose to look to Title VII
over Title VI, since, "despite the fact that Title IX was explicitly modeled on Title
VI, this court has held that Title VII ... is 'the most appropriate analogue when
defining Title IX's substantive standards.'" Id. at 832. The court then concluded
by observing that it was "well settled that Title VII does not require proof of overt
discrimination." Id. at 833.
93. See Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 655, 689 (noting that
district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all counts).
94. See id. (contending that district court erred in granting summary judg-
ment to defendants).
95. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)
(holding that monetary damages were available for intentional violation of Tide
IX); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983) (noting rela-
tionship between monetary damages and proof of intent); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 728 (1979) (affirming that implied right of action exists under Title
IX).
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IX violation. 9 6 The Sixth Circuit focused its discussion on cases that
had been interpreted under the Spending Clause analysis, particu-
larly focusing on the notice requirement of such legislation, as well
as the Supreme Court's more recent interpretations concerning
sexual harassment in schools.
The court began its discussion with cases that analogized Title
IX to Title VI. It began with Cannon v. University of Chicago, which
first construed an implied right of action under Title IX.97 The
majority then turned to the Court's decision in Guardians Associa-
tion v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, in which a plu-
rality of the Court held that Title VI allowed a private right of
action providing certain declarative and injunctive relief for unin-
tentional violations. 9 8 The Homer majority also noted that a differ-
ent plurality of the Court in Guardians espoused the view that
monetary damages were not available for unintentional discrimina-
tion.99 In espousing this view, the Homer court noticed the Spend-
ing Clause rationale invoked by Guardians.0 0
The Sixth Circuit then examined various cases involving sexual
harassment in schools, beginning with teacher-on-student situa-
tions, then extending to student-on-student situations. 101 In Frank-
lin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court held that
damages were not available for Tide IX violations from the school
district in a teacher-on-student sexual harassment case unless the
discrimination was intentional. 0 2 The Sixth Circuit again noted
the same Spending Clause analysis applied in Franklin that had
96. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 689 (noting that, in all relevant cases, Supreme
Court consistently has invoked "contract" rationale; that, under Spending Clause
legislation, relationship between federal government and federal funding recipi-
ent is consensual and recipient must have notice before being subject to money
damages).
97. See id. (explaining Supreme Court's rationale that Title IX was patterned
after Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, which had been construed as containing
implied right of action) (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-703).
98. See id. at 690 (noting that relationship between monetary damages and
proof of intent first emerged in Guardians).
99. See id. (recognizing that Justice White's rationale for ruling did not gain
majority).
100. See id. (explaining that "'make whole' remedies are not ordinarily appro-
priate in private actions seeking relief for violations of statutes passed by Congress
pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause") (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981)).
101. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 690-93 (noting that all cases cited Spending
Clause analysis from Guardians).
102. See id. at 690 (observing thatJustice White applied same Spending Clause
analysis to Title IX that he used in Guardians under Title VI).
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been applied in Guardians.10 3 The Homer court then turned to an-
other peer harassment case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, which also invoked the Spending Clause rationale of Guardi-
ans.10 4 The Homer majority looked to the Gebser case to note the
distinctions between Title IX and Title VII. 10 5 Finally, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Horner looked at the most recent Supreme Court case in the
sexual harassment context, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion.10 6 In Davis, the Court considered whether a damages action
under Title IX would lie against a school board for student-on-stu-
dent harassment. 10 7 The Sixth Circuit recognized that Davis ex-
tended the Gebser rule to student-on-student sexual harassment and
again cited the Spending Clause analysis, holding that private dam-
ages actions were available only where "federal funding recipients
act[ed] with 'deliberate indifference' to 'known' acts of
harassment. '" 10 8
The Homer majority ultimately determined the intent issue by
noting that, although the Supreme Court had not expressly ruled
on this point, the Court would likely hold that proof of intentional
discrimination was required for money damages under Title IX
when a facially neutral policy was challenged. 10 9 The court ended
this conclusion by reiterating the importance of the Spending
Clause analysis and observing that notice was the crucial factor in
not allowing monetary damages for unintentional violations. As the
Homer court quoted from Franklin, " [t] he point of not permitting
monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that the receiv-
ing entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a
monetary award." 110
The Horner majority then addressed the question of which stan-
dard to apply in determining intent when a facially neutral policy
103. See id. at 690-91 (noting that Court applied Pennhurst rationale that reme-
dies were limited under Spending Clause statutes when alleged violation was
unintentional).
104. See id. at 691 (observing once again that Title IX was modeled after Title
VI) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1998)).
105. See id. (explaining that conceptual framework distinguished Title IX
from Title VII).
106. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 692.
107. See id. (holding that federal funding recipients must act with deliberate
indifference to known acts of harassment) (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1999)).
108. Id.
109. See id. (observing that Supreme Court consistently has applied Justice
White's Spending Clause analysis from Guardians in Title IX decisions).
110. Id. at 692 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,
74 (1992)).
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was challenged.111 The court noted that the current test, the delib-
erate indifference test, had only addressed cases involving sexual
harassment, and thus would not be appropriate to apply in the pre-
sent situation.' 12 Stating that this case was the Title IX equivalent
to Guardians, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that Justice White, in
Guardians, advocated the "discriminatory animus" standard for in-
tentional discrimination when a plaintiff challenged a facially neu-
tral policy.113 Ultimately, the Homer majority concluded that no
standard needed to be adopted at that time.1 14
The Homer majority then turned to the question of the plain-
tiffs' proofs of intentional discrimination under Title IX.11 5 In
making its decision, the court looked to the district court as well as
the Homer I findings.1 6 The court noted that the Homer I panel
looked to the Policy Interpretation and its requirements for a Title
IX violation. 17 The Homer court ultimately held that the plaintiffs
111. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 692-93 (noting that only current and clear test was
that of deliberate indifference).
112. See id. at 693 (citing Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 882 (5th
Cir. 2000)). The Homer court further noted that "intent" in the sexual harassment
context meant "actual notice" of third party abuse and a failure to stop the known
abuse. See id.
113. See id. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584
(1983)).
114. See id. (concluding that court need not adopt any test since plaintiffs in
present case did not even demonstrate violation of Title IX, let alone intentional
violation).
115. See id. at 693-94 (asserting as incorrect plaintiffs' argument that they had
established prima facie case under Title IX).
116. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 694 (noting Homer I panel's holding that there
were genuine issues of fact regarding Title IX violation).
117. See id. at 694-95. The Homer I panel observed that Title IX regulations
required that institutions provide gender-blind equality of athletic opportunity to
students. See id. at 694 (citing Homer 1, 43 F.3d at 273). Such a determination in
turn required an evaluation of several factors, including " [w] hether the selection
of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abili-
ties of members in both sexes[]" Id. at 694 (citations omitted). To satisfy the
effective accommodation requirement, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (1) states that "an
institution must effectively accommodate the interests of both sexes in both the
selection of sports and the levels of competition, to the extent necessary to provide
equal athletic opportunity." Id. (citing Policy Interpretation, Section VII.C.1., 44
Fed. Reg. at 71,417) (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (emphasis omitted).
Regarding the interests of both sexes, Homer I observed that the interests of mem-
ber schools was not necessarily the same as the interests of the students, and the
record did not reveal the interests of female students at other schools. See id. at
695 (citing Homer , 43 F.3d at 274). As to the selection of sports, the Homer I
court noted that Title IX plaintiffs must establish that:
(1) The opportunities for members of the excluded sex have historically
been limited;
(2) There is sufficient interest and ability among the members of the
excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a reasonable expectation of
intercollegiate competition for that team; and
20021 437
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had not proven a Title IX violation. 1 " The court further noted
that, even if the plaintiffs had proven a violation in this case, they
still would have failed to prove an intentional violation, since there
was no evidence of discriminatory animus. 1" 9 Lastly, the Homer
court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees. 120
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent took a different approach than that taken by the ma-
jority. Noting that the primary issue in Homer was whether the
plaintiffs produced any evidence of intentional discrimination as a
predicate for compensatory damages, the dissent stated that the an-
swer to this question depended entirely on the definition of "inten-
tional discrimination" under Title IX.121 In answering this
question, the dissent ultimately concluded that the deliberate indif-
(3) Members of the excluded sex do not possess sufficient skill to be se-
lected for a single integrated team, or to compete actively on such
team if selected.
Id. (citing Homer 1, 43 F.3d at 274) (quoting Policy Interpretation, Section
VII.C.4.b., 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418)(1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86)). With
respect to these elements, the Homer I court held that although the plaintiffs had
proven the first requirement, they had not proven the second or third. See id.
(citing Homer , 43 F.3d at 274). As to the selection of the levels of competition,
the court stated that the plaintiffs had offered no proof that their interests were
not being met, despite the policy that allowed them to play on boys' fast-pitch
softball teams. See id. at 696.
118. See id. at 696 (noting that there could not be intentional violation with-
out finding of violation per se).
119. See id. at 696-97 (noting that plaintiffs offered no evidence of discrimina-
tory intent). The court observed that the plaintiffs had not proven that the
"[dlefendants had actual knowledge of the discriminatory effect of their rule, yet
failed to remedy the violation." Id. at 697. According to the majority, the plaintiffs
and the dissent merely disguised a "constructive notice" argument as a "deliberate
indifference" test; that because there was a male but not female team, the defend-
ants must have known that they were treating males and females differently. See id.
at 697. The Homer majority rejected this argument because it read Title IX as
requiring perfect parity. See id. The majority asserted, however, that the statute
itself does not require gender balance. See id. at 697 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (b)
(West 1990)). Moreover, the court noted that it would be "impossible for the de-
fendants to be on notice that they were violating Title IX simply because they had
only sponsored boys' fast-pitch softball," and that it was undisputed that females
were allowed to try out for traditional male sports. Id. Thus, according to the
Homer court, there could not be any finding that the defendants had knowingly
violated Title IX in this case. See id.
120. See id. at 697-98 (noting that, to recover attorneys' fees, party must either
receive at least some relief on merits of claim (such as judgment, injunction, or
consent decree), or show that lawsuit was primary "catalyst" for causing defendant
to alter conduct favorably toward plaintiff, and that plaintiffs here did not meet
burden) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 775, 760-61 (1987); Payne v. Bd. of
Educ., Cleveland City Sch., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996)).
121. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 698-99 (Jones, J., dissenting) (concluding that de-
liberate indifference standard was most appropriate standard to use).
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ference standard governed for "intentional" violations of Title
IX.122
The dissent began by stating that, when federal rights have
been invaded, it is up to the courts to adjust their remedies to grant
such relief as they deem necessary. 123 The dissent further declared
that, in order to engage in a proper analysis, the court must look to
Title IX itself.124 After defining discriminatory animus, the dissent
espoused its view that the animus standard advocated by the major-
ity would almost "never be met in a Title IX athletic-equity case." 125
The dissent then explored the inequalities that still exist for women
in the area of college athletics, despite the significant gains that
have been achieved. 126
The dissent examined the discriminatory animus standard and
found within it a number of flaws. First, the dissent maintained that
the animus standard would only frustrate, rather than promote, the
remedial purposes of Title IX.127 Next, the dissent declared that
the standard itself rested on flimsy legal ground. 128 The dissent up-
held its view by citing a number of Supreme Court cases, as well as
many other courts, which have been very reluctant to hold a similar
statute to the animus standard. 129 The dissent particularly focused
122. See id. at 698 (Jones, J., dissenting) (noting that majority suggested in
dicta that discriminatory animus was proper standard to evaluate intentional
discrimination).
123. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992);Justice v.
Pendleton Place Apartments, 40 F.3d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1994)).
124. See id. at 700 (Jones,J., dissenting) (stating that, although majority opin-
ion has many references to Title IX, it never closely examines Title IX's
provisions).
125. Id. at 701 (Jones,J., dissenting) (defining discriminatory animus towards
women as having "'a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex...
directed specifically at women as a class'" (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1993)) (comparing with Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 632 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
126. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 701 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing study conducted
on Title IX's Silver Anniversary that recognized that females still did not have their
fair share of opportunities to compete).
127. See id. at 701-02 (Jones, J., dissenting) (noting that "animus" standard
allowed defendants to remain ignorant of Title IX obligations with little fear of
having to pay damages for depriving students of equal athletic opportunities).
128. See id. at 703 n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Guardians as sole source
for standard and noting that Guardians never produced a consistent ruling for ani-
mus standard).
129. See id. at 702-03 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Greater L.A. Council on
Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1987); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd.
of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 330-31 (2d Cir. 1998)). The dissent noted that, in
each of these cases, the federal funding recipient denied equal opportunity to
plaintiffs under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, another Spending Clause
anti-discrimination statute. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 703 n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting).
2002]
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on Davis, where the Supreme Court could have applied the animus
standard as a prerequisite for monetary damages under Title IX,
but instead ruled that the "deliberate indifference" standard would
apply to find intentional discrimination.130
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has not specifically determined whether a
plaintiff must show intent in Title IX cases.131 Many cases, however,
have tried to determine what the result would be if the Court did
address this issue.132 The Horner court appropriately found that,
because Title IX has been deemed to be enacted under Congress'
Spending Clause powers, intent must be shown in these cases in
order to prevent liability without notice. 133
The Homer court correctly noted the Supreme Court's holding
in Franklin that if a school has intentionally discriminated against a
victim, then the victim may receive damages.134 Many courts, in-
cluding Homer, have read Franklin to mean that an intentional viola-
tion of Title IX is required in order to recover compensatory
damages.13 5 However, "[t]he holding in Franklin merely states that
compensatory damages are available for intentional violations of Ti-
tle IX."1 3 6 Thus, although the Franklin Court hinted strongly
In such cases, there was no "animus" against the plaintiff; rather, the defendants
were "indifferent" to their federal obligation, which, according to the dissent, was
much like Title IX athletic case defendants. See id. (JonesJ, dissenting). Still, the
violations were held to be intentional because the defendants had full knowledge
of their discriminatory conduct. See id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
130. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 703-04 (Jones, J., dissenting).
131. SeeYusuf v. Vassar Coll., 827 F. Supp. 952, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating
that Supreme Court has not determined intent element under Title IX).
132. See, e.g., Homer, 206 F.3d at 692 (stating, "although the Supreme Court
has not expressly ruled on this point, we think that it would likely hold that proof
of intentional discrimination is a prerequisite for money damages under Title IX
.... .).
133. See id. at 692 (noting that Supreme Court has consistently applied Spend-
ing Clause analysis and Guardians to its Title IX decisions).
134. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-76 (1992) (rec-
ognizing that equitable relief accorded plaintiff no remedy in that case).
135. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 690 (noting that, "[t]he [Franklin] Court held that
damages were not available for Title IX violations ... unless the discrimination was
intentional"); see also Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014, 1032 (7th Cir.
1997) (declaring that, "[t]he Supreme Court in Franklin ...conclud[ed] that
monetary damages are not available for unintentional violations of Title IX ....").
136. Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting
that Franklin holding was consistent with Guardians and Ferguson holdings). In
Franklin, the Supreme Court addressed respondents' argument that, since reme-
dies were limited under Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation was
unintentional, the same should apply to intentional violations. See Franklin, 503
U.S. at 73-74. The Franklin Court disagreed with this argument, stating that, "[t]he
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against monetary damages for an unintentional violation of Title
IX, there was no specific holding as such. 137 As a result, the courts
must turn elsewhere to determine whether intent is required for
compensatory damages under Title IX.
In examining Title IX, the majority in Homer turned to the
Spending Clause analysis articulated in Guardians.138 The Homer
court correctly interpreted the Pennhurst holding that remedies
were limited under Spending Clause statutes when the alleged vio-
lation was unintentional. 139 Although Title IX has not been explic-
itly stated to be a Spending Clause statute, many courts have
interpreted it as such. 140 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Davis
stated that, "we have repeatedly treated Title IX as legislation en-
acted pursuant to Congress' authority under the Spending Clause
"141
If Title IX is thus definitively determined to be legislation de-
veloped under the Spending Clause authority of Congress, an issue
concerning unintentional violations arises, due to the "contract" ra-
tionale. 142 The "contract" rationale is defined as follows: when
Congress acts pursuant to its Spending power, it creates legislation
that is "much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed condi-
point of not permitting monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that
the receiving entity ... lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award ....
This notice problem does not arise in a case ... in which intentional discrimina-
tion is alleged." Id. at 74-75 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
137. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (1992); see also Ferguson, 157 F.3d at 674 (stat-
ing, "Franklin does not explain what relief may be appropriate in cases of uninten-
tional violations.. . ).
138. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 690 (noting that Justice White applied same
Spending Clause analysis to Title IX that he used in Guardians under Title VI).
139. See id. at 690-91 (observing that point of not permitting monetary dam-
ages for unintentional violations is that receiving entities of federal funds lack no-
tice that it is liable for monetary awards) (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75).
140. See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75 & n.8. The defendants in Franklin
argued that Title IX should not be viewed solely as having been enacted under
Congress' Spending Clause powers, because Title IX also rested on powers derived
from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 75 n.8. The Supreme
Court concluded that a money damages remedy was available for an intentional
violation of Tide IX irrespective of the source of Congress' power in enacting the
statute. See id; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287
(1998).
141. Homer, 206 F.3d at 692 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 639 (1999)).
142. See id. (noting Davis reasoning that, when legislation is treated as under
Spending Clause authority, private damages actions are only available when recipi-
ents of federal funding had actual notice of potential liability).
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tions.'14 3 In interpreting the language in spending litigation,
courts therefore recognize that a state cannot knowingly accept the
contract if the state is unaware of the conditions imposed by the
legislation or is unable to determine what is expected of it.'44
In light of the "consensual relationship between the federal
agency and recipient," the Homer court concluded that, "the recipi-
ent must be aware of the conditions attached to the receipt of those
funds."'1 4 5 Allowing monetary damages for unintentional violations
could thus be extremely problematic because the funding recipient
may be liable for large sums of money without having any advance
notice that they are committing a wrong. In this context, the Homer
court correctly concluded that monetary damages should not be
available for an unintentional violation of Title IX, specifically
when the federal funding recipient did not have notice of their al-
leged violation. 146
In accordance with the Homer decision, lower courts have also
held that a Title IX plaintiff must prove an intentional violation to
recover compensatory damages.147 Many lower courts that have
been faced with the more general issue of intent under Title IX
have determined that a plaintiff need not show intent for a Title IX
violation."48 This finding is consistent with the Guardians' holding
that, under Title VI, a plaintiff may recover for an unintentional
violation." 4 9 The Supreme Court in Guardians, however, further
noted that, for an unintentional violation, only injunctive, non-
143. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see
also Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (observing that notice requirement also bears on proper
definition of discrimination in sexual harassment private damages action).
144. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25 (noting that crucial inquiry was not
whether State would knowingly undertake obligation, but whether State could
make informed choice).
145. Homer, 206 F.3d at 692 (resolving that, although Supreme Court had not
expressly ruled on this point, it would likely hold that plaintiff must prove inten-
tional discrimination in order to receive money damages under Title IX disparate
impact theory).
146. See id. at 690-93 (relying on Spending Clause analysis articulated in
Guardians and Pennhurst).
147. See id. at 692; see also Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 918
(M.D. La. 1996) (concluding that monetary damages are not available under Title
IX without finding of intentional discrimination).
148. See Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 833 (10th Cir.
1993) (holding that Title IX plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination to
prevail on claim); Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 827 F. Supp. 952, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(same).
149. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983) (ob-
serving that Title VI had been administered in same manner for almost two de-
cades without Congressional interference).
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compensatory relief was available to such a plaintiff.150 In Pederson
v. Louisiana State University, meanwhile, the district court looked at
unintentional violations of Title IX specifically in the context of
compensatory damages.1 51 In doing so, the Pederson court con-
cluded that monetary relief was not available for an unintentional
violation of Title IX absent a showing of discriminatory intent. 152
The Pederson court, as well as other courts, is thus consistent with
the Homer holding.
Other guidance for this issue comes from statutes similar to
Title IX. Although courts have not explicitly determined Title IX's
intent requirement, several other Acts require a showing of discrim-
inatory intent in order to recover compensatory damages.155 Many
courts, including the Supreme Court, have looked to such other
Acts, including Title VI and Title VII, in order to interpret Title
IX.154 Indeed, the Homer court recognized several cases that used
Guardians for its analysis of Title VI under the Spending Clause in
order to interpret Title IX.1 5 5
Proof of discriminatory intent is not required to state a dispa-
rate treatment claim under Title VII. 156 A plurality of the Guardians
Court held that compensatory relief was available only in a Title VI
150. See id. at 602 (stating that legislative history affirms presumption that
only limited injunctive relief should be granted as remedy for unintentional
violations).
151. See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 917-18 (noting that neither Supreme Court
nor Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had specifically determined this issue).
152. See id. at 918 (using Guardians opinion as guidance for analysis of ques-
tion). The Pederson court also cited the Spending Clause analysis, stating that
"[w] hen Congress enacts legislation pursuant to its Spending Power.... the Court
will presume that Congress does not intend to create a private right of action enti-
tling citizens to recover monetary damages for non-compliance with the statutory
requirements absent a showing that the non-compliance is intentional." Id. (citing
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 599). In making its conclusion, the court further noted that
there was no evidence to rebut this presumption or show Congressional intent to
the contrary. See id.
153. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that compensatory damages are not available under Title II of ADA and
Rehabilitation Acts without showing of discriminatory intent). The Ferguson court
looked to both Guardians, outlining Title VI, and Franklin, outlining Title IX, to
conclude that compensatory damages should not be available under Title II with-
out proving discriminatory intent. See id. at 673-74.
154. See Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that
statutes share same goals and Title IX mirrors substantive provisions of Title VI).
155. See Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 685, 690-93 (6th Cir.
2000) (discussing Spending Clause analysis in Franklin, Davis, and Gebser). For a
discussion of the Homer court's analysis of the Spending Clause, see supra notes
101-08 and accompanying text.
156. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977)
(stating that, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive .. .is not required under a dispa-
rate-impact theory"); see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 833
2002]
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suit for intentional violations. 15 7 Consequently, there is a differ-
ence of opinion on the statutes as to the requirement of proof of
intentional discrimination in order to recover damages.1 58 Many
courts have looked to such statutes specifically in order to deter-
mine whether or not to require intent under Title IX actions. 159
An issue persists, however, over the applicability of either Title
VI or Title VII with regard to which Act is a more appropriate ana-
logue for Title IX. Courts and commentators alike differ as to
which Act is a more appropriate analogy for Title IX.160 Further-
more, a dispute exists over the true meaning of Guardians, a Title
VI case.16 1 The Guardians opinion did not gain a majority of the
court, and the Justices differed over whether Title VI required
proof of discriminatory intent in order to recover compensatory
damages. 62
Despite this debate, however, it appears as though the Su-
preme Court regards the Guardians decision concerning uninten-
tional violations as binding and precedential law. Also, the
Supreme Court in Gebser clearly favored the use of Title VI over
Title VII by noting the distinctions between Title VII and Title IX,
and by using the Spending Clause analysis invoked in Guardians, a
Title VI case. 163 Moreover, courts have used Guardians in other
(10th Cir. 1993) (stating that, "it is well settled that Title VII does not require
proof of overt discrimination").
157. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 602-03 (also observing that, like Title II, there
is no evidence that Congress intended private plaintiffs to recover monetary
awards).
158. Compare Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833 (observing that Title VII does not re-
quire proof of intentional discrimination) with Guardians, 463 U.S. at 602-03 (hold-
ing that proof of intentional discrimination is required for damages under Title
VI).
159. See Miller, supra note 45, at 717 (noting that Petaluma court, relying on
Guardians' decision, reasoned that, since Title VI required intentional discrimina-
tion, so should Title IX claims (citing Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993))).
160. Compare Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832 (stating that, "despite the fact that Title
IX was explicitly modeled on Title VI, this court has held that Title VII... is the
most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards. .. .")
with Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286-87 (1998) (recogniz-
ing various differences between Title IX and Title VII and noting that Title VI and
Title IX are parallel to each other).
161. See Miller, supra note 45, at 717-18 (stating that, "the Court's fragmented
opinion will further confuse rather than guide.").
162. See Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir.
2000) (noting that separate majority of Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
monetary damages available for unintentional violation).
163. See id. at 691 (noting Gebser's statute analysis in furthering conclusion
that Title VI was proper standard).
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cases to help define and interpret other acts. 164 Lastly, by consist-
ently invoking the "contract rationale" of Guardians in Title IX
cases, the Supreme Court has assented to the analogy of Title VI to
Title IX in at least some circumstances. Most notably, the analogy is
made when such Acts are deemed to have been enacted pursuant
to Congress' Spending Clause power. 165 Thus, despite the debate
over the fragmented and complex Guardians decision, Guardians
and its Tide VI analysis are important and influential in the inter-
pretation and analysis of Title IX.
The Homer dissent embarked on the issue of defining "inten-
tional discrimination," and determined that the correct standard
was that of deliberate indifference. 166 The issue of compensatory
damages and violations of Title IX have been mostly, if not entirely,
looked at in cases of sexual harassment. 167 Many of these cases
have turned to the question of what standard to use to determine
intent in order to answer the issue, as did the dissent in Horner.168
The Homer dissent asserted that the correct standard to use in de-
termining whether or not a violation of Title IX has occurred is the
"deliberate indifference" standard.169 In using a deliberate indiffer-
ence standard, one must have actual notice of his or her wrongdo-
ing and yet fail to respond. 170 Thus, in using this standard, the
notice problem that plagues so many courts would be eliminated.
And yet, the act of purposefully ignoring accounts of discrimination
closely resembles intentional discrimination. Consequently, it
164. See Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that compensatory damages were not available under Title II without a sbow-
ing of discriminatory intent).
165. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 656-57 (1999)
(citing Spending Clause analysis); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (citing to Guardians and Spending Clause analysis).
166. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 698 (JonesJ, dissenting) (claiming that Supreme
Court precedent "clearly dictate[d]" that court use deliberate indifference stan-
dard in assessing plaintiffs' claim).
167. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 630 (holding that deliberate indifference stan-
dard governed in cases of sexual harassment under Title IX); Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 275 (1998) (same); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 61 (hold-
ing that Title IX allowed monetary remedy).
168. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91 (holding that damages remedy will not lie
under Title IX unless official acts with deliberate indifference to discrimination);
see also Homer, 206 F.3d at 698 (Jones, J, dissenting) (asserting that deliberate in-
difference standard should be used to assess case at hand).
169. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 698 (stating that, "Supreme Court precedent
clearly dictate[d] that [the court] use a deliberate indifference standard in assess-
ing Plaintiffs' claim").
170. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (affirming that, in a deliberate indifference
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would appear as though the Homer majority and dissent are not too
far apart on the issue. Still, an issue remains over the correctness of
the standard used. A more careful analysis of the issue suggests that
the deliberate indifference test advocated by the Homer dissent
should apply only to sexual harassment cases and not cases involv-
ing gender athletics.
It is important to note that all cases discussing the "deliberate
indifference" test involved Title IX claims of sexual harassment. 171
One general principle that has emerged in such harassment claims
is that courts will generally hold an employer liable under a "knew
or should have known" standard. 172 An issue over whether sexual
harassment and gender athletic cases should be evaluated differ-
ently under Title IX, however, may still exist.173
Past Supreme Court cases involving sexual harassment claims
under Title IX also invoked the Guardians' "contract rationale."
These cases held that the correct standard to use was the "deliber-
ate indifference" standard. However, although many of these
courts cited Guardians, Guardians defined "intentional discrimina-
tion" as "discriminatory animus," as did the Homer majority. Fur-
thermore, there may be reason to distinguish sexual harassment
cases, such as Franklin, from gender athletics cases, in Homer.174 In
Pederson, the Fifth Circuit held that the deliberate indifference test
that has been applied in sexual harassment cases "has little rele-
vance" in determining whether an academic institution discrimi-
nated by failing to accommodate female athletes. 175 As the Pederson
court noted, the requirement of sexual harassment cases (that the
school have actual notice and yet fail to respond) is not applicable
for purposes of determining whether an academic institution dis-
criminated on the basis of sex by denying females equal athletic
opportunity.176
171. See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 629 (holding that damages could lie against
recipient of Title IX funding recipient of peer harassment only where recipient
acted with "deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment").
172. See Senatus, supra note 61, at 387 (recognizing that principles emerged
from earlier cases).
173. See Miller, supra note 45, at 718 (stating that "Tide IX does not require
intent to discriminate with respect to peer harassment claims").
174. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 882 (5th Cir. 2000) (recog-
nizing that requirement of sexual harassment cases is not applicable for cases con-
cerning gender equality in athletics).
175. See id. (noting past cases where Supreme Court held that schools sued
for harassment under Title IX must have actual knowledge of harassment and can-
not be liable on theory of strict liability).
176. See id.
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The difference between such cases is that, in sexual harassment
cases, the issue is "whether the school district should be liable for
discriminatory acts of harassment committed by its employees."' 177
In athletic discrimination cases, however, it is the institution itself
that is discriminating. 178 The proper test, therefore, is not whether
the institution knew of the actions of others or was responsible for
such actions; rather, it is whether such institution intended to treat
females differently on the basis of their sex by providing unequal
opportunities. 179 In conclusion, there are important reasons for
distinguishing sexual harassment cases from gender athletics cases,
and an analysis of this issue suggests that the Homer dissent incor-
rectly concluded that deliberate indifference is the correct standard
to apply in gender athletics cases under Title IX.
VI. IMPACT
Various issues arose after the enactment of Tide IX concerning
its scope. 8 0 The Supreme Court subsequently had to decide sev-
eral cases precisely to resolve such issues.18 1 Although the Court
has determined that monetary damages are available in a Title IX
action, 8 2 the issue of whether one can receive monetary damages
for an unintentional violation has yet to be resolved.'8 3 The Homer
majority attempted to solve this issue by relying on a similar statute
and the Spending Clause analysis.' 8 4 The dissent, however, favored
a different technique by relying on what he believed to be the cor-
rect standard of intentional discrimination. 18 5
The future of Title IX cases seem to indicate that, in gender
athletics cases, one will not be able to receive compensatory dam-
177. Id.
178. See id. (recognizing that sexual harassment cases hold that school dis-
tricts themselves must have actual discriminatory intent before they will be held
liable for discriminatory acts of their employees).
179. See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 882 (concluding that record before court
showed intent to discriminate).
180. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1992) (ad-
dressing issue of whether Title IX extended to student-on-student sexual harass-
ment); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 62 (1992)
(addressing issue of whether Title IX authorized award of monetary damages).
181. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (holding that Title IX extended to student-on-
student cases of sexual harassment); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76 (holding that mone-
tary damages were available under Title IX).
182. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60.
183. See Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 206 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir.
2000) (noting that Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on this point).
184. See id. (arguing for discriminatory animus standard).
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ages without an intentional violation.18 6 The trend of the Court is
clearly to follow its major Title IX decisions such as Gebser, Franklin,
and Davis, as well as Guardians, a Tide VI case. Despite this trend,
the question of whether the cases should be interpreted under the
Spending Clause analysis or under the standard of intentional dis-
crimination still exists. Moreover, it remains uncertain whether the
cases should be interpreted differently depending on their context.
Should sexual harassment be treated differently than intercollegi-
ate athletics? If not, then it would appear as though the Homer dis-
sent correctly analyzed the case, and the Homer majority was
incorrect in its analysis concerning Guardians and the Spending
Clause.
Until this issue is resolved, courts will not have guidance as to
how to construe intercollegiate athletics cases. Few courts have
dared to venture into this area; the preference seems to be to re-
frain from embarking upon such difficult issues when it is not abso-
lutely necessary.'8 7 The fact remains that, although the same cases
may be cited and used, an entirely different result may be found.
Lastly, it is important to recognize that notice is a crucial factor
in determining whether to subject a defendant to damages under
Title IX. This point has been illustrated in a number of Supreme
Court cases. Still, it has not been definitively decided that Title IX
is even legislation enacted under the Spending Clause and thus
subject to such conditions188
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted
Title IX in order to resolve undecided and unclear issues. Under
the Homer decision, a plaintiff will not be able to recover monetary
damages under Title IX in an intercollegiate athletics case without
a showing of intentional discrimination.18 9 If other courts choose
to follow such a decision, then it follows that such plaintiffs will only
"strike out" with Title IX.
Dawn N. Zubrick
186. See id. at 692-93 (holding that Title IX requires showing of intentional
violation in order to receive compensatory damages).
187. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 880 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating
that, since appellants had not argued that damages should be available for unin-
tentional discrimination, court would not address accuracy of district court hold-
ing); see also Horner, 206 F.3d at 693 (concluding that, because plaintiffs had not
established Title IX violation, court need not adopt any test to determine standard
of intentional discrimination).
188. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
189. See Homer, 206 F.3d at 685 (holding that Tire IX plaintiff required proof
of intentional discrimination in order to recover compensatory damages).
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